

























Department of Economics 
Utah State University 
3530 Old Main Hill 
Logan, UT  84322-3530 
 
 














Department of Economics 
Utah State University 
3530 Old Main Hill 






The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author(s).  They are not necessarily 
endorsed by the Department of Economics or by Utah State University. 
 
Utah State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its 
programs and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, 
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation. 
 
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from:  Department of Economics, Utah 
State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT  84322-3530. 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Arthur J. Caplan and John Gilbert.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for noncommercial purposes by any means, provided that 
























Using information from on-line graded assignments in an intermediate
microeconomics course, we ﬁnd that non-procrastinators (both early-
starters and front-loaders) obtain higher scores than their dillydallying
counterparts. We also ﬁnd that while busier students tend to start
their assignments earlier, they nevertheless back-load the bulk of their
eﬀort.
Keywords: Procrastination, early-/late-starters, front-/back-loaders,
student performance
JEL: A14, A22, C23, I29The Folly of Dillydally∗
Abstract
Using information from on-line graded assignments in an intermediate
microeconomics course, we ﬁnd that non-procrastinators (both early-
starters and front-loaders) obtain higher scores than their dillydallying
counterparts. We also ﬁnd that while busier students tend to start
their assignments earlier, they nevertheless back-load the bulk of their
eﬀort.
Keywords: Procrastination, early-/late-starters, front-/back-loaders,
student performance
JEL: A14, A22, C23, I29
1 Introduction
For advice to be sage it must be logical. It must also pass the test of
time, i.e., be shown (at least anecdotally) to have been good advice across
generations. And when available, empirical evidence must support it. Like
most pieces of advice, “Stop dillydallying!”, has passed the ﬁrst two of these
tests. It is for the most part logical, since procrastination generally does
steal time. It has also been handed down to us by our parents (“clean your
room now, not tomorrow”), our professors (“don’t cram for the exam”), and
is now passed by us to our students. However, because of our inability to
∗We acknowledge the support of Lyssa Enzmann at Aplia for providing the data which
has enabled the creation of our early-starter and front-loader variables and Sanjib Sarker
for research assistance. We also thank the students who participated in this study.
1actually measure the degree of procrastination among procrastinators, we
have, until recently, been precluded from putting the advice to an empirical
test.1
Thanks to web-based course-management systems such as WebCt and
Blackboard, the ability to measure procrastination among college students
has ﬁnally become a reality. This paper reports ﬁndings based on one such
system, Aplia.2 In Spring 2004, on-line practice and graded homework as-
signments were provided to students in an intermediate microeconomics
course. Assignments for respective topics became available at the begin-
ning of each week and were automatically graded at week’s end. Students
were able to access the assignments at any time during the week to answer
any question in any order and to change answers whenever desired. Aplia
recorded the dates and times that each question for each assignment was
ﬁrst accessed by the students.
By compiling this information, we are able to distinguish early- from
late-starters and “front-loaders” from “back-loaders” (front-loaders access
relatively more of their questions earlier in the week than back-loaders). We
ﬁnd that, all else equal, early starters and front-loaders score higher on their
graded assignments. In other words, there is indeed folly in dillydallying.
Further, we ﬁnd evidence that busier students start assignments earlier than
their less-occupied counterparts, but then back-load their eﬀort.
The next section brieﬂy describes the the Aplia assignments and our
procrastination measures. Variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics for
the panel data used in this study are also presented. Section 3 presents our
empirical model and results. Section 4 concludes.
1The closest studies to ours are those by Borg et al. (1989), Johnson et al. (2002)
and Krohn and O’Connor (2004), but these studies deal with measures of eﬀort (often
self-reported) rather than delay. Procrastination has nonetheless been the subject of an
interesting strand of theoretical research (see Akerlof, 1991; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999
and 2001; and Fischer, 2001).
2Available at www.aplia.com.
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Students were required at the beginning of the semester to purchase online
access to Aplia in order to obtain their weekly practice and graded homework
assignments.3 Practice assignments were optional, but highly recommended.
Graded assignments were required. The assignments for each topic, begin-
ning with budget constraints and ending with cost minimization, became
available at the beginning of the week and were automatically graded at
week’s end.4 There were a total of nine graded assignments throughout the
semester. Students were able to access the problems at any time, in any or-
der, and as many times as they desired prior to the grading deadline. Aplia
kept track of the date and time that a student ﬁrst accessed each problem
from a graded assignment and then automatically graded each problem at
the grading deadline. Students were subsequently provided with their scores
and informational feedback on each question.
Deﬁnitions and summary statistics for the data used in this study are
provided in Table 1. The ﬁrst seven variables are based on information
compiled by Aplia, while the remaining ﬁve were obtained via an end-of-
semester survey. Of particular interest are the variables START and SKEW,
which distinguish two diﬀerent types of procrastinators. START measures
the time diﬀerence (in days) between the grading deadline for a given graded
assignment and when the student ﬁrst accessed the assignment to answer a
question. For example, if the grading deadline for the assignment was April
2nd at midnight, and the student ﬁrst accessed the assignment on April 1st
at 2 pm, the START value for this assignment would be 1.42 days. Students
with relatively high (low) START values may therefore be considered early-
3A total of 22 students completed nine graded assignments, consisting of between four
and eight questions per assignment.
4The textbook for the course was Varian (2003). The assignments, unbeknownst to the
students, were taken directly from Bergstrom and Varian (2003). Because the assignments
were posted en masse at the beginning of the semester, students had access to any graded
assignment at any time before its due date. However, no students began an assignment
before the beginning of the week that it was due.
3(late-)starters. Late-starters are one type of procrastinator.
SKEW measures the skewness of the distribution of a student’s time
diﬀerences (in minutes) between the grading deadline and when the student
ﬁrst accessed each question contained in the assignment. This is a standard
skewness measure, calculated as:
n
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where n is the number of questions per assigment, xi is the number of days
prior to the due date that question i was started, ¯ x is the average number of
days before the due date that questions were started, and s is the standard
deviation. SKEW therefore accounts for the degree to which a student
front-loads or back-loads their start times across all questions of a given
assignment. Students with negative (positive) SKEW values are considered
front-(back-)loaders. Back-loaders are a second type of procrastinator.
For example, suppose we have three students (1, 2, and 3) with respective
START and SKEW values presented in Table 2. In this case, student 1 is an
early-starting front-loader, student 2 is an early-starting back-loader, and
student 3 is a late-starting front-loader.
3 Empirical Model and Results
We test our data for ﬁxed and random eﬀects using the standard panel-data
model (Hsiao, 1986 and Greene, 2003):
yij = x0
ijβ + vij i = 1,...,n, j = 1,...,m (1)
where yij is the SCORE for student i on assignment j; x0
ij is a vector
of both assignment-variant and assignment-invariant explanatory variables
taken from Table 1; and β is a corresponding coeﬃcient vector. The expres-
sion for vij depends on whether pooled OLS, ﬁxed, or random eﬀects are
assumed. In the case of pooled OLS, vij = α + εij, where α is a common
intercept term across all students and assignments and εij is an i.i.d. error
4term with constant variance. For ﬁxed eﬀects (FE), vij = αi + εij, where
αi is a student-speciﬁc intercept term (which therefore does not vary over
assignments). For random eﬀects (RE), vij = α + ui + εij, where ui is a
student-speciﬁc random element, similar to εij, except that for each student
a single draw enters the regression identically for each assignment.
Results for the various speciﬁcations of (1) are presented in Table 3.5
Based on the reported signiﬁcance levels for the Breusch and Pagan (1980)
LM and Hausman (1978) χ2 speciﬁcation tests, we focus our attention on
the results for the FE model. We begin by noting that early-starters fair
better than late-starters. For each day that a student ﬁrst accesses an assign-
ment before the grading deadline, their score increases by approximately 3.5
percentage points, all else equal. In addition, front-loaders add an average
of approximately 11.35 percentage points to a given assignment. Procras-
tinators - both late-starters and back-loaders - therefore perform worse on
graded assignments than their non-dillydallying counterparts.6
Recent theoretical contributions oﬀer compelling interpretations of both
rational (dynamically consistent) and irrational (dynamically inconsistent)
procrastination. For example, Fischer (2001) models leisure as an exhaustible
resource whose time-allocation with respect to work in any given period is
(rationally) driven by the procrastinator’s rate of time preference and elas-
5The results were obtained using Intercooled Stata 7.0 for Windows 95/98/NT. We
have tested our model for heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and within-panel
(AR1) autocorrelation using feasible generalized least-squares (Greene, 2003). Our hy-
pothesis for possible heteroskedasticity is that students with higher GPAs may exhibit a
smaller error variance for SCORE. Within-panel autocorrelation could also exist due to
the typical ebb and ﬂow of the semester, i.e., students often report feeling ”burned out”
at some point near the middle to end of the semester. However, we have no a priori reason
to expect cross-sectional correlation due to the inherent independence that exists between
students. The results correcting for each of these possible error-structure complications
were qualitatively the same as those obtained without the corrections. We therefore report
the uncorrected results below
6Our results also suggest that students who completed the practice assignments per-
formed better on the accompanying graded assignment, and that (based on results for the
RE model) GPA has a similar positive eﬀect on performance.
5ticity of intertemporal substitution. To the contrary, Akerlof (1991) depicts
procrastination as the (irrational) response to misperceived “salience costs”
that inﬂate the total costs associated with current opportunities. As a re-
sult, the cost of procrastinating is reduced on tasks that can be completed in
the future. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999 and 2001) diﬀerentiate Akerlof’s
present-biased preferences between na¨ ıve and sophisticated procrastinators
and introduce a menu of tasks on which the procrastinator might choose to
procrastinate.
A common implication of these studies is that the relationship between
the number of tasks facing the individual and the degree to which she will
procrastinate on any given task is (positively) monotonic. For instance,
Fischer’s (2001) framework accommodates task aversiveness, whereby an
optimizing student works on a less-aversive task ﬁrst before moving on to a
more diﬃcult one. Task aversiveness therefore suggests that the more tasks
required for the student to work on, the greater his chance of procrastinating
longer on any given one. Indeed, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) show this
result for a “partially” irrational procrastinator, which in turn supports
Solomon and Rothblum’s (1984) ﬁnding that the majority of procrastinators
cite “too many other things to do” as a major reason for procrastinating.
We are able to test this “monotonic-procrastination” hypothesis for both
late-starting and back-loading students. As Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate, the
results across these two types of procrastinators are divergent with respect
to the variable CREDITS. In the case of early-/late-starters (Table 4, with
START as the dependent variable), enrolling for an additional credit hour
induces an increase in start time by approximately 0.15 days. However,
in the case of front-/back-loaders (Table 5, with SKEW as the dependent
variable), an additional credit induces more back-loading.7 Thus, students
who presumably keep busier on campus dillydally less in terms of when they
7Since CREDITS is redundant in the model explaining SCORE (see Table 3), neither
START nor SKEW are (statistically speaking) endogenous. The low R
2 for this model
indicates that CREDITS nevertheless explains only a small amount of the total variation
in SKEW.
6start an assignment, but more in terms of when they choose to devote the
bulk of their eﬀort toward completing it. These divergent results suggest
a reﬁnement in our thinking about student procrastinators irrespective of
whether their procrastination is a rational or irrational response to perceived
opportunity costs.
4 Conclusions
Using information from on-line graded assignments, we ﬁnd that non-procras-
tinators obtain higher scores than their dillydallying counterparts. This is
true for both early-starters and front-loaders, although the magnitude of
the front-loading eﬀect on student performance is approximately three times
larger than that of the early-starting eﬀect. Taken together, these results
suggest that the admonishment “Stop dillydallying!” is indeed sage advice.
We also ﬁnd that while busier students tend to start their assignments
earlier, they nevertheless back-load the bulk of their eﬀort. These diver-
gent results suggest an important tradeoﬀ for university administrators con-
cerned about student performance. Promotion of an accelerated graduation
program (e.g., three- as opposed to four-year programs), which would appar-
ently keep students busier over a shorter period of time, may induce more
early-starting and back-loading behavior. Our results suggest that, given
the relative magnitudes of these two types of procrastination, this type of
program may in turn worsen student performance.
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9Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean (SD)*
SCORE Percentage correct per graded assign-
ment.
69.89 (31.43)
PRACTICE 1 = attempted corresponding practice
assignment, 0 = did not.
0.57 (0.50)
START Time diﬀerence (in days) between the
grading deadline for a given graded as-
signment and when the student ﬁrst ac-
cessed the assignment to answer a ques-
tion.
2.13(2.46)
STDEV Standard deviation of the number of
days before grading deadline that each
problem was attempted per graded as-
signment.
0.26 (0.58)
SKEW Skewness (in minutes). 0.23 (1.08)
SKEWDUM 1 = (Skew < 0), 0 otherwise. 0.35 (0.48)
INTACT STDEV × SKEWDUM 0.10 (0.34)
GENDER 1 = male, 0 = female. 0.70 (0.46)
GPA Grade point average (4.00 highest pos-
sible).
3.39 (0.35)
CREDITS Total number of credits enrolled per
student for semester.
11.78 (3.80)
HRSWORK Total number of hours worked per week
at a wage-paying job during semester.
18.27 (15.88)
CHILD 1 = has at least one child under the age
of 18 living at home, 0 otherwise.
0.13 (0.34)
* Overall means (Mean) and associated standard deviations (SDs). The sample
size for each of the variables is 207, except for GPA, CREDITS, and HRSWORK,
which are 198 each.





11Table 3: Eﬀect of Procrastination on Score
Explanatory Variables OLS Fixed Eﬀects (FE) Random Eﬀects (RE)
CONSTANT -28.07 47.49** -29.73
(19.63) (3.59) (28.11)
PRACTICE 15.00** 17.47** 16.08**
(3.96) (4.79) (4.24)
START 4.33** 3.51** 3.89**
(1.00) (1.00) (0.98)
STDEV 5.11 6.44 5.84
(5.99) (5.73) (5.68)
SKEWDUM 12.93** 11.35* 12.03**
(4.71) (4.56) (4.50)






F(k,n − k) 13.17** 10.77**
Wald χ2(k = 7) 74.05**
R2 0.33 0.26 0.32
LM χ2 12.96**
Hausman χ2 19.28**
Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations is 198 for each
regression model. ** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level, * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
12Table 4: Determination of Late-Starting Procrastination
Explanatory Variables OLS Fixed Eﬀects (FE) Random Eﬀects (RE)
CONSTANT -1.19 1.66** -1.37
(1.75) (0.29) (2.31)










F(k,n − k) 3.59** 3.97*
Wald χ2(k = 7) 11.69*
R2 0.06 0.004 0.08
LM χ2 1.94
Hausman χ2 1.70
Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations is 198 for each regres-
sion model. ** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level, * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
13Table 5: Determination of Back-Loading Procrastination
Explanatory Variables OLS Fixed Eﬀects (FE) Random Eﬀects (RE)
CONSTANT 0.72 0.26* 0.72
(0.80) (0.14) (0.84)










F(k,n − k) 1.79 0.17
Wald χ2(k = 7) 8.16
R2 0.02 0.0003 0.04
LM χ2 0.36
Hausman χ2 0.10
Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations is 198 for each regres-
sion model. ** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level, * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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